

December 8, 2015
10:30 AM

How does Able Archer change my presentation?

(rough download of thoughts)

--C-II was not the the only, or the last, high-point of risk of all-out nuclear war in the CW (Cold War).

--AA (Able Archer 83) (denoting the whole War Scare (for the Soviets) of 1981-85, with high point in Sept.-November 1983) was frighteningly close in its origins and circumstances to the current period, in particular from the Kiev coup in Feb. (?) 2014 to the present and beyond.

--AA is a closer parallel to the present than C-II.

--(I was a participant in the events of AA: in September, at Mutlangen and Bitburg, protesting both the P-II and the CM, the former the night of the KAL-007 shoot-down. The Fast for Life was going on at that time; I was present when Willy Brandt came to see ----- of the Fast. (Greens mad at me for suggesting that Brandt be a main speaker at their demo). (I really wanted to stop the P-II.)

The year before, in June 1982, I was in Leningrad Harbor with Greenpeace, protesting Soviet testing, where I met Primakov with Sergei Plekhanov (and? Tair Tairov?) recommending a moratorium on testing, and no-first-use. The Freeze rally of one million was meeting that same week in Central Park. Brezhnev offered a Freeze, which in retrospect was almost surely sincere (would it not have stopped the P-II and CM deployments? And the MX? What of the SS-18, which I urged to be dismantled at the IUSA in Moscow in 1986 (?)? Countered by Reagan with SDI, another log on the fire of the War Scare.

--My concern about the P-II, expressed at rallies, was for the very reason that it freaked out the Soviet leaders: It was clearly a first-strike weapon, therefore destabilizing in crises, with a capacity for decapitation.

--What I didn't know was that this period was already a crisis for the Soviets, in which they feared an imminent, deliberate US surprise attack. Thus the very prospect of the P-II, which would make such an attack more effective was destabilizing ("if there's to be a war, let it be before P-II."

By the same token, it would seem less likely that the US would attack under cover of AA in November, before the P-II arrived. However: a) Fischer conjectures that the Soviets suspected some P-II were already there by then. (possibly true?) b) The US could figure that the Soviets would be less expecting of an attack before P-II

arrived: their earlier attack could be part of their cover and surprise. (An SLBM could do the decap job already, especially with a CM).

--P-II negated Soviet planning for:

--dispersal of leaders to bunkers

--thought of LOW based on tactical warning: not enough warning time;

--centralized control by leaders of execute: it was necessary to delegate; Dead Hand was an inevitable response. (In theory, it gave Chernenko, or the ailing Andropov, something useful to do other than to execute in the minutes available: switch on Dead Hand. (Though I wonder whether it was really expected to be switched on BEFORE warning of P-II: surely; in the whole crisis period, especially AA)

--The US intelligence failure was just as great as C-II (or any other failure: e.g., Tet offensive, Pearl Harbor, 9-11 if it was, Iraq WMDs (if it was)). SNIE's were exactly wrong. And for familiar reasons: Inability to see how others saw us, including our covert actions known to enemies but not to most of our government, let alone public; failure to take this into account in predicting or understanding their concerns or actions; unwillingness to perceive others as responding to our own policies, or that we might be "provoking" responses.

--The SU saw themselves as particularly vulnerable to a **surprise** US FS. We at RAND worried (needlessly) about a SU Pearl Harbor attack in 1954-56-58-60. But Ike had rejected that for us (when it would have been most effective: to LeMay's dismay) and no other president had considered it. We didn't think of that as a live consideration in SU mind: "We wouldn't do that, we can't imagine that anyone would think we might."

--Yet if one considered that a possibility (as Andropov and Akhromeyev did) then the Reagan administration was giving the Soviets a great deal of evidence—"compelling," one might say—that that was what we were preparing to do (and not certainly merely preparing it to threaten, to provide domestic benefits. As Brown asked (and one could ask now!): WHY the biggest peacetime buildup in history? Why these particular weapons? (MX, P-II, CM, ALCM, Stealth B-2) (in addition to high accuracy for Trident/Poseidon, large numbers).

A real answer (as before): to maintain as "strategic" role for the USAF (and its dependent industries). Not to let that go to the Navy (which should have been done with Polaris in 1960 or a little later). (A cost of creating an independent Air Force after WWII). Why strategic bombing at all (after WWII, when it had failed).? Same reason. And for a large heavy-bomber air force, to support R&D for air superiority, and to support a civilian domestic and international air industry.

A price of “providing a nuclear umbrella” over NNWS (that could afford their own deterrent), “preventing proliferation,” Type II deterrence, and maintaining US hegemony in Europe and Japan by providing a unique, essential role: Doomsday Machines (plural: in SU as well as US: eventually, if testing is renewed, a number of them) not merely capable of but **liable to** causing the death of nearly all humans and extinguishing nearly all other vertebrates.

It is Type II, our “umbrella” (and need to build up the SU “threat” to magnify the need for this) that rationalizes the need for an ability to disarm a superpower, the SU (to support our threats of FU against troops of the SU or its allies, to deter response in kind or escalation).

Our allies in Europe didn’t want to be protected from Soviet attack (or, be freed from the economic burden of defending themselves by conventional means) merely by the threat of US forces in Europe responding to SU attack in a limited, regional way. (Weapons exploding in Europe, both East and West). They wanted the Soviet masters of the Warsaw Pact to be deterred by a threat against the SU. But SU response in kind (which they were capable of, to some degree after 1949 and 1954, supposedly in 1957 but actually in 1964) meant against the US itself, not just Europe. It seemed incredible that the US would incur this risk if they didn’t have the means to limit it

(to what? Truly, infeasible after 1964; but “limit it to less than the SU could inflict prior to its being attacked” (what good is that? Unless the US expected itself to be attacked, for reasons other than its having attacked first?) . Really, the latter ability doesn’t really make a “nuclear attack on the SU in retaliation to an invasion of part of Europe” more “reasonable,” credible, even as the result of a “commitment,” unless we can lower the SU response to VERY low levels (zero? Impossible: UNLESS decapitation works).

That was impossible, has been for half a century. But we could act as if—with great spending, effort—we thought we could do that, crazily, and as if we were prepared to try (in a crisis). And that might provide ENOUGH plausibility that we would actually do it, as to deter (SU invasion. Deter SU use of nuclears in Europe if war erupted, or if we used them? It should have been enough to deter former, but it didn’t, in terms of SU planning. Certainly not latter.)

The Doomsday Machine on our side is motivated/rationalized by a) **keeping Germans and Japanese from having their own (minimum) deterrence forces** (adequate to deter direct attack, not for “umbrellas” over others); is that still necessary, or worthwhile? (If alternative might be to dismantle the doomsday Machine on our side).

b) to keep a strategic role for the Air force (and states with MM). (!!!) (though Trident is also a DM: doctrine would have to be changed to reduce that to min det scale: no damage-limiting, umbrella, NFU; at least, situation would be much more

crisis-stable (and arms race stable) with unilateral US rejection of ICBMs (even if Russia kept its ICBMs, without expansion or even with). There would be very little incentive left for Russia to preempt in any circumstances; hence, for US (to respond to false alarm; hence, little role for warning at all). (Other NWS don't have it, after all!)

Sovs thought pretty much the way Ike did: war in Europe would be nuclear, LNW was not feasible, it would certainly escalate even if it was tried briefly, so you "might as well" go first as well as you could. But Soviets added, in 80s: don't wait for tactical warning; go with as much surprise as possible ("THEY will") and as soon before enemy launches as possible. Go on "strategic warning" that war—any war, in Europe or enemy surprise attack—is highly likely, imminently.

--For Soviets, crazily (like War Games, not unlike RAND in Fifties) the test was simply a measure (crazily, a single number) of "relative strength" (for RAND, SU FS casualties, lower than WWII, from disarming attack on US). "US will attack if that number is low enough for us" (prewar relative strength of SU). (? Regardless of the consequences for the US of attack? Mad! What matters the pre-attack relative strength, in overall economic/political/military terms, if the SU is "destroyed" in the attack?! For RAND, it was crazy to imagine that SU would choose WWII if only they could be assured that in destroying their superpower rival they would suffer no more than twenty million immediate dead!

For US, how could Soviets suppose that it was important enough to the US to destroy their superpower rival to do so whenever their relative "strength" (not just in strategic nuclear terms but in economic, technological, etc.) was sufficiently high, **regardless** of what they would suffer in return (that's even crazier than the JCS/USAF/RAND).

How could they believe that the US would, or might, not be deterred from attacking—given that they could destroy 75 % of SU warheads in a surprise attack—when they would face "only" 2000 surviving nuclear warheads?! (Fig. 1 in PFIAB report). (And US, presumably, would have more. As if "prevailing" depended on relative numbers of surviving warheads—as Power and Russell thought—not on absolute numbers or on the absolute damage either suffered, especially the attacker).

But they did!

Meaning: Top leaders can be **crazy**; and they can get their craziness not only implemented, but confirmed, by intelligence operatives who want to keep their credibility and influence with leaders and their jobs and will turn up "evidence" that the leaders are not crazy. (As in Iraq; or in USAF intelligence on gaps; or Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq; now against ISIS).

MAD was misleading as a description of our policy (though it really was mad). Our planning, development and posture was never for "MAD" only (or at all, explicitly). It did describe the actual results to be expected, but not what we planned or aimed for or spent for. (MAD was going to happen, but as a failure of our planning and preemption). The acquisition and maintenance of DMs (on both sides) was mad from the beginning to now. The actual plans for wartime, and the readiness for preemption, were mad. On both sides: and worse to have two mad adversaries than one. (Would we really change posture and forces, if the Russians wisely adopted minimum deterrence? Or vice versa? The rationale and opportunity would be there; but would they affect policy?)

There was not just a hypothetical conflict between deterring nuclear attack on one's own country (Type I) and either threatening FS for Type II umbrella or seeking damage-limiting by preemptive counterforce (and decapitation) under attack or if "war is inevitable." The conflict occurred in AA 83 and the security of both the SU and the US was greatly reduced: destruction averted only by "luck" (Petrov).

This would have been true in C-II except that K/SU had virtually no preemptive capability: the situation really was "crisis-stable" in terms of preemption. (Vs. AJW, in terms of timing, period). YET it almost exploded. (It wasn't stable against **a US FS in response to either tac nucs against US invasion forces, or in response to a carrier being destroyed by a nuclear torpedo**. Even though there was no fear of a SU surprise attack, in White House or Pentagon, no possibility.)

In AA 83 the loss of control might again have risked war—see KAL-007!—but SU fear of US surprise attack—strengthened by US provocations-- might have triggered SU preemption (not a temptation or capability in 1962).

That could happen now, all of this. The strategic situation is like 1983, not 1962. It "should" have been stable then, but it wasn't! SU correctly feared the very nature of the US FS plans: which reflected the WWK/USAF strategy. (This wasn't "mine." Or Athens/Ann Arbor. **How did it differ from SIOP-62? (This seems to be a new thought for me: Leon Sloss talked about taking out my plan from the safe, but the significant aspects of my plan were eschewing decapitation, eschewing China (was this true in 1983, or now?), no-cities (infeasible then, really aimed at ever?), maintaining centralized control (really feasible, then or now? In conditions of central war, EMT? (And cyber war!!!)**

What's the difference from SIOP-62, without these options being implemented? "Options"—many different "small attacks" (against Russia? Bah)—reserves? (maybe; so what?); NUC WINTER ANYWAY, for MAO's! All the same—as would have happened in 1961 with SIOP-62 (or -63). But even without that! Deliberate attack on all C3. (No more on East Europe, since 1991, or since it was in NATO—except in "defense"). Compare PD-59 and "prevailing" to SIOP-62, NESG 2009, "Optimum mix." !

I lost. And what was I really after, anyway? A) To get China off automatic list (like Shoup); and (B) postpone attack on cities, in a small hope (better than zero) most would be spared indefinitely (and oppose "maximum bonus/collateral damage, a hundred holocausts); and c) to limit delegation (on same argument McNamara hoped to prevent French and British independent forces: need for coercion, centralization), lessen chance of low-level initiation of war (Kunsan, Quemoy), get locks on weapons, not only allied but US, even SAC (bombers and MM: failure) and Polaris (failure);

None of these were achieved (except for locks on allied weapons? And eventually on ours). Unless China, sometimes. (Now?) (b) was not militarily feasible (or bureaucratically) (or alliance-wise); c) was not bureaucratically achievable.

I did NOT go for: a) **giving up preemption, CF, damage-limiting, LOW (though I hoped to make it less "necessary," inevitable): failure)** ;

b) **giving up Type II, nuclear FU in Europe or elsewhere** (McNamara wanted to go in this direction, and I wrote a speech to that effect in 1963, but I didn't propose it and it was diplomatically infeasible);

c) **limiting scale of forces, going to min det** (which I believed, no?); on the contrary, Air force "approved" my concepts in order to get more forces, B-70: McNamara had to back off concept to limit force requests;

d) explicitly avert Holocaust destruction, **Doomsday Machine** ("overkill" even of Soviets, though I questioned this: it was desired by USAF)

I questioned but didn't explicitly oppose **overkill** of allies and neutrals: though no-cities was in direction of this. (Didn't call for minimizing fallout: yield, air burst, targeting near borders)

e) I didn't foresee **Nuclear Winter**, any more than anyone else: but "no-cities" was and still is (on a large scale!) addressed to this. (If cities are to be the targets in minimum deterrence, it can't be very many! Vs. India-Pakistan!) (Toward abolition).

f) Didn't know fire damage was not included: so that the difference between first and second strike has always been enormously exaggerated (aside from Nuclear Winter) and the damage from a first strike enormously understated: looked at from body count, not injured, transport, communications, hospitals and doctors, societal ("B country intact" Kahn). WWII emphasis on first strike, not being surprised (Barbarossa, Pearl Harbor) still persists in military. (Russians see "Hitler" as we do Japanese, in terms of Pearl Harbor/Barbarossa.)

Surikov (sp?) is right that US analysts look at first-vs.-second strike results, as SU came to do. But these are totally misleading!

JCS was basically right that my coercive strategy was “infeasible” on both sides. It wasn’t really used as a basis for US strategy later. But Nitze and others imagined it might be used against us (which SU never had the slightest intention to do, even if it had been more feasible. It **could** be used on a non-nuclear state (say, Hitler against UK, if he had had five bombs)—but does even India or Pak or Israel (maybe) plan to do this? Or conceivably, by a NWS to a “small” NWS, to deter them from responding; but not with much likelihood of success. (US vs. China, earlier, or North Korea).

So, confronting a DM, I not only didn’t address that directly (my plan was written when I discovered that) but my coercive concepts didn’t have the effect of affecting the maintenance and expansion (and imitation) of the DM at all (unless to allow the possibility of not hitting China directly; but was that still true in 1969, for Nixon?) Did some major options leave off some cities, as one of my options? Maybe; or maybe not. Did the JCS or SAC ever seriously consider not hitting Moscow? Could the president have made that stick, even if he ordered it? Would he, anyway, if Washington and New York were being hit?

In 1961, we learn that we alone have a FS capability or DM. So how do “we” respond? Ask (oh dear) how did I respond? Gilpatric! (Even worse: in private, to JFK, I recommend a coercive threat! The way Nitze later imagined the Soviets addressing us! To make FU and FS threats more credible! (To which the realistic answer would be, if you’re the US, or later the SU: you aren’t really going to do this; if you tried, your air force would subvert it; and even if they tried—to spare cities and command centers—they would fail; and our plans are to blast you to hell anyway, so no chance of it’s working (and we have the means to do it: unlike, say, K in 1962, if we’d made that/my threat then: except against Europe, which he did!) (and then, when I thought Berlin was settled—ha ha, it wasn’t, thanks in part to Gilpatric (plus Mongoose, under my later boss and later hero RFK)—I go along with Ann Arbor!

The 600 million dead from our attacks was greatly underestimated, even without Nuc winter; and the societal effects of a few weapons on us, likewise (but then, almost entirely Europe), Europe wiped out [**I don’t remember asking that, or focusing on that: SU capability against Europe! As distinct from the effect of our own weapons, if the wind blew the wrong way).**] (Did Kaysen/hsr/WWK later that year, 1961? The JCS, to JFK?)

So I simply didn’t focus on, address, attempt to change the “counterforce” element in the strategy (on the contrary, if anything I reinforced that, to the point that McNamara had to tone it down, make damage-limiting subsidiary instead of a major objective, to be achieved with larger, newer forces)—in deference to WWK and Andy Marshall (WWK in turn influenced by our Air Force sponsors; and AJW picked up on damage-limiting). Just as, for second-strike survivability, the Air Force turned to airborne alert, LOW (and hard silos) but not to revetments for bombers, shelters: what they liked, for FS capability (except for hard silos: the RAND contribution?) and ZI basing instead of Europe (which favored B-52s anyway). The Air Force

picked up from “me” the damage-limiting, counterforce: which favored preemption, and did NOT limit force size, at all (at most, McNamara sought and achieved a ceiling on vehicles: but not on warheads, going for MIRV (and eventually, MX! No ceiling on warheads in arms control talks?!))

Not only a Triad of Doomsday Machines, but eventually a Triad of FS Counterforce forces (Trident). Three first-strike forces (one highly vulnerable: only FS, but a threat to SU ICBMs, encouraging them to delegate and to go to LOW: OR PREEMPT (which I would have thought “unthinkable” in the 70’s and 80’s, but I was wrong, for the 80’s (and now?) in the SU.

And that despite years of détente in-between (when? 19—to --?); just as the present WAR SCARE (for me) is after a long period of “end of the Cold war.”

Cold War III: as dangerous as Cold War II, which turns out to have been as dangerous as Cold War I. (Latter: no chance of a SU surprise attack, though we obsessed about it, as Soviets did in Cold War II, unknown to us, when a US surprise attack was physically possible—as was Soviet—but politically unthinkable, even for Reagan, I believe (“we must deter war”: after seeing *The Day After*, 1983): but he didn’t talk or act that way, scaring us into the Freeze movement, but the Soviets into considering preemption!

We don’t see ourselves through the opponent’s eyes: as he actually sees us (which is closer to how we actually are than what we see when we look in the mirror, which is a false image; though his view may also be exaggerated, in the other direction, like Andropov’s! or Putin’s! “His view” may not be right, either—but it may be opposite to what we think he must see! (How nice, good, safe we are, in all ways, in intention anyway.)

As for me: I do have more to confess, than I ever thought. Not only what I did do (Gilpatric, proposals to JFK, Ann Arbor, attitudes during C-II, feeling about Turkish deal; going to Vietnam...under Lansdale...)

But what I didn’t do (above! Not only, not revealing to public.) My actual drafting and proposals weren’t just “inadequate, incomplete” or just “infeasible, not practical militarily or bureaucratically) but they strengthened dangerous tendencies: counterforce, preemption (even though I didn’t believe in those), hence LOW, etc.

(What if China attempted to “limit damage”? Look what happened when SU did, after C-II—to do it like us, on same scale!) (Or UK, or France; India, Pak?) Or Germany or Japan?! (not just min det)

Subtract from my plan, no-decap, no-cities, and you’ve got: a DM, on hair-trigger (as before): SIOP-62! And we’ve had it ever since! My and McNamara’s approach had no chance of changing that; and did not, either under Republicans or Democrats, and even after end of Cold War (temporary: awaiting CW III) (“hedging against” the

(desired) return! Which they have now under Putin! Our US-desired opponent, our new Hitler.

12/8/15 3:01 PM; 4884 words. 4-1/2 hours, including breakfast. Now for lunch, shower, shave; haircut 4:15. (talked with Robert, on this, half an hour).

12/8/15 9:44 PM

I've just spent an hour reading and commenting (briefly) on Parts II and III of the 2013 NSArch BB's (briefing books) on the War Scare of 1983.

Several things make me feel faint, as I read them (a very unusual feeling: not a metaphor or exaggeration: I'm on the verge of feeling dizzy, faint...with shock, horror...)

- 1) The 180-degree intelligence failures, of SNIEs in 1983 and 1984, to perceive that Soviet leaders were genuinely afraid (however one evaluates the reasonableness of that fear: they were certainly mistaken) that the US was seriously considering an imminent surprise attack. I just read this again in the Joint net evaluation of US and Soviet forces, November 14, 1983 (just after Able Archer, six weeks after Petrov). It made me slightly faint.
- 2) That the Soviet response to this fear was to prepare, in a serious and costly way, both to preempt that attack (before US/NATO vehicles had launched: i.e., on "strategic" warning, not tactical warning of an ongoing or just-about-to-be-initiated (minutes; or perhaps hours) attack. And to "manage" a protracted nuclear war following this preemption (or if they failed to preempt). This was not for show or threat. Just as Khrushchev kept secret the fact that warheads were on Cuba and that tactical nuclear weapons with warheads were there, these preparations and directives and expressions of both fear and intent to preempt if possible were kept secret. But K meant to make concessions as necessary to avert any use of these weapons. The Soviets were not considering diplomatic means of any kinds, so far as I yet know, to avert the US surprise attack they thought was being prepared and which they seriously planned to preempt, i.e., to initiate WWII in 1983, against SAC.

I really have never thought that either superpower was so insane as to plan strategic preemption (i.e., in the absence of compelling evidence that an insane enemy attack had left the ground on its way to its homeland).¹

¹ (This could still be called a form of "preemption," because it is motivated principally by, or requires, a strong belief that a large-scale nuclear attack is otherwise imminent, though not necessarily that it has actually yet been launched.

It is dizzying to discover that one of them was: and that could still be true. It happened to be the SU, which is not much surprising than if it had turned out to be the US.

But the possibility that that could again be true (say with India or Pakistan; but not only them, possibly the US or SU in pre-WWIII) is suggested by the fact that the SU in this case was not quite crazy (though mistaken) in believing this was possible in the US (in the light of SAC doctrine and preparations, and beliefs about the SU, especially before Brezhnev); and that an emphasis on preemption was first developed in the US, in SAC, and continues as doctrine, even if (according to Kehler) "no longer so primary a focus." The latter (healthy) condition may reflect ignorance of how close the SU came to attacking in 1983!

In contrast, we could reserve the term "preventive war" for initiation of a large-scale nuclear attack in the absence of that belief: either as escalation of a limited conflict (which is not expected to escalate to all-out war by enemy action) or in the absence of ongoing armed conflict.

IN BOOK, WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES ALL THIS MAKE?

1. Focus on the issue of **decapitation**. The attraction to it, an automatic target in SIOP-62. Resistance to my effort to abandon it (despite my argument, and guidance in BNSP). Almost sure rejection of my efforts, even in 60's. Anyway, British and French targeting! (Despite Athens and Ann Arbor: fecklessness of WWK/McNamara/DE challenge: both forces existed, and would not change targeting. (Any more than USAF! Or Navy?!))
2. But that was the heart of the coercive strategy. Not enough to forego city attacks (which was also infeasible, given priorities both in USAF and SU, and co-location): Leghorn was wrong (self-serving for Itek). Navy in 60 could only hit cities ("hold in reserve": did SU ever adopt this?); but USAF never meant to give up cities, they just offered themselves for "quick hard target kill" (accuracy, landlines, high alert, numbers, large yield) as well as cities.
It was essential to strategy to preserve C3 on both sides. Impossible militarily and bureaucratically.
3. Yet the "**war-fighting**" part of "our" strategy (the USAF/WWK part—that McNamara downplayed publicly, so as not to endorse an indefinitely large force, but which he didn't interfere with in planning) not only remained but was re-emphasized by Ford/Schlesinger (perhaps by HAK earlier? Or only, "limited" options?) and especially under Carter: PD-59., and Reagan. (Bush? Move away) (Clinton? Not abandoned; nor GWB; nor BHO: despite minority challenges, overcome).

So, show difference between my "coercion" and "war-fighting." (They weren't really compatible; both infeasible; but war-fighting really rejects C3 survival and coercion and no-cities; and war-fighting wins (over minimum deterrence, the real alternative).

Why mention (my) coercion at all? Well, it was adopted by McNamara for a year or two (scaring K, leading up to C-II!); it was supposedly replaced by MAD, BUT NOT REALLY: what continued was not "coercion" but (forever) war-fighting with decapitation.

4. Note that when you give up coercion, the ONLY thing that offers the possibility of coming out survivably (or even, "almost untouched": both of these, a false promise) is decapitation. Hence the emphasis on achieving it.
5. AND the emphasis in the SU on neutralizing its effects: deep underground shelters for leaders; P-2 negates these!; so, delegation, Dead Hand, either automatic (proposed by Surikov, rejected), or switched-on, and with human components, dispersed.

If you want to achieve decapitation and paralysis, you have to say and indicate that you do not mean at all to attempt it, but are relying on coercion (as Mcnamara did in Ann Arbor), lying, then do it by surprise, hoping they have not

delegated. Carter did the opposite, in PD-59: trumpeted decapitation! They responded as should have been (but was not) expected.

But to negate decapitation, you have to delegate or automate, and declare this! They did first, not second! Secret was kept! Exactly the Dr. Strangelove perplex: make change that is dangerous, especially if not announced, but deterrent (only) if it is announced: then keep it secret!

(Like Soviet plans for preemption in AA! Could have said: We believe you might launch surprise attack, especially under cover of an exercise; and in that case, **we might preempt**. That might have struck Allies and US as paranoid ("merely trying to keep us from our exercise")—yet they might have made an effort to reassure SU during the exercise (e.g. by observers) (not practicing radio silence of deployment! Desist from provocative maneuvers). And it could have stimulated public discussion in Europe and the US about the madness of preempting under any circumstances (or going to FU in Europe, as in the crazy exercise!)

The only disadvantage of their doing that would be to give up the supposed benefits of preempting by surprise the possible US attack. But these benefits were totally illusory! It would have been mad for the US to attack by surprise (or otherwise); and mad for the soviets to preempt! But that last was Andropov's second madness—his first being expectation of US surprise attack-- along with Soviet military (and US military!)

6. AA demonstrates the likelihood of madness in superpower leaders. (And possibly: age/approach of death; illness and medication (hospital!); see LBJ, (Ike!); JFK (Addison's, drugs, back pain); Nixon (alcohol, perhaps psychosis) ("paranoid"—Andropov, LBJ; GWB?) (Reagan at end of term, during IranGate? And Alzheimer's? See Wilson's last years); We won't know! (Yeltsin: drunk).
7. Does Putin share Andropov's KGB suspicion of West? He's certainly encountering hostility and opposition comparable to early Reagan's! Plus second massive buildup, as then. Of FS weapons! (Unwillingness to let go of ICBMs—on either side).
8. Role of individuals who stand in the way of all-out war (and others who do not!) (JFK and K, at end; Arkhipov; Petrov; (who in 1979, delayed: who spoke to Brz?))
9. Emphasize: critically dangerous role of vulnerable ICBMs AND C3, and of belief/cult/magical thinking about preemption, strike-first and fast and big, damage-limiting, role of USAF (and land-based forces in Russia)